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Coexistence of Monies as the Asymmetric
Equilibrium of an Anonymous Game




The present paper shows that the presence of a government com-
mitted to accepting legal tender ensures that legal tender coexists with
either an international or a local currency, even when residents have
identical preferences. This result is obtained as an asymmetric equi-
librium of an anonymous game with atoms. Hence, monies coexistence
may arise as a consequence of money demand equilibrium conditions,
rather than strategic externalities associated with economic integra-
tion.
There is a symmetric equilibrium where everybody goes for legal
tender only when it gives a payoff greater than the other money. The
results are derived by constructing a game for the choice of UK resi-
dents between Pounds and Euros.
1 Introduction
The introduction of the European common currency puts both prospective
EMU members and neighborhing countries in a peculiar situation. Will the
Euro eventually become a currency common to UK and Poland etc. as
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well, regardless of these countries formally joining the EMU? If this happens,
will the Euro be the unique circulating money or will it coexist with these
countries’ legal tender?
A distinct but related issue is that of dollarization. To what extent do res-
idents of a country which monetary authority credibly commits to exchanging
legal tender for US dollars continue to demand the national currency? It is
expected that the preferability of the use of legal tender vanishes as the
fraction of residents holding US dollars increases.
Another example is given by the choice between the use of cash versus
credit cards. The advantages of credit cards increase as their use and accep-
tance spread over the community.
In all these instances, the distribution of choices among residents affects
every single resident’s choices. For example, the incentive to using the Euro
to any UK resident is affected by the others residents’ choices. Yet, this
influence is not likely to take place at the individual level, rather it acts in
an anonymous way through the distribution of choices over the entire UK
population.
The object of the present paper is to study the effects of the government’s
commitment to accepting legal tender on private agents’ choices as regards
to the demand for legal tender in the presence of alternative monetary in-
struments.
Anonymous games (see [1]) provide a natural framework for the analysis
of issues of demand for monetary instruments (see [3].)
In principle, the presence of the government imposes a departure from
the anonymous game setting as its action cannot be taken as negligible by
the other players. Still, in this study the non-negligible influence of the gov-
ernment’s commitment is modeled by assuming a strictly positive probability
of every agent meeting some other agent (namely the government) willing to
exchange legal tender (even when it gives a payoff lower than the alterna-
tive monetary instrument). While this tantamounts to assuming a strictly
positive frequency of private agents meeting with the public sector as [2] do,
making this assumption permits to cast the analysis inside a parametrized
family of standard anonymous games.
As is usual in monetary models, this model displays multiple equilibria:
there exists an asymmetric equilibrium (i.e. individuals with same prefer-
ences play different actions) where legal tender coexists with an alternative
money even when residents have identical preferences. A symmetric equi-
librium where everybody goes for legal tender is selected when legal tender
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gives the higher payoff. These possibilities are illustrated by constructing a
game for the choice between Pounds and Euros.
No assumption on matching processes between pairs of agents, let alone
non-uniform processes, is made. Rather, a foundation for the coexistence of
monies is given that is independent of the existence of more than a single
regional economy, but that relies only on the alternative money (which is
thought of as an international currency) providing higher utility than what
legal tender does. Utility from holding the alternative money can be seen
as depending on a strategic externality similar to but different from the one
Matsuyama et al. [3] postulate. This is related to how often a resident ex-
pects to meet another resident (and not a member of the other country as in
Matsuyama et al. [3]) holding the other currency which is not legal tender
(NLT), to the end of not diverting trade form within the community as a
means to preserving the community members’ welfare. This interpretation is
supported by the examples of local communities that use own monies which
are not legal tender (such as Disney dollars, the Itacha, NY, currency, and
Raam in Vedic City.) Such a strategic externality makes the analysis inde-
pendent of both the size of the two economies and their degree of integration.
Hence, the coexistence of a community money and legal tender appears to
be a phenomenon analogous to the coexistence of the Euro (that is not legal
tender in the UK) and the Sterling Pound. In Matsuyama et al. [3] it is
the strictly positive probability of a resident meeting a non-resident (who
holds NLT) that associates the strategic externality from holding NLT with
economic integration.
Hence, an important result of this paper is that coexistence of monies
in the form of an asymmetric equilibrium obtains even if this probability is
zero, showing how the strategic externality from holding NLT may arise from
money demand equilibrium conditions, rather than from economic integra-
tion. Some evidence supporting this conclusion may be found in the goal of
MCommunities which are usually meant to prevent wealth outflows from the
area where the community resides. Historical examples support the view that
the existence of the strategic externality may be independent of the degree
of economic integration, even for fiat monies (which have no intrinsic value.)
This study is related to the literature on bimetallism, since the coexistence
of monetary instruments is analyzed. It departs from that literature in that
none of the coexisting monies is a commodity, nor any fixed exchange rate
between monies is modeled. It is related to the literature on the absence-of-
double coincidence of needs models of money, although the important issue
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of the disparate short-run and long-run effects of changes in the quantity of
money is not touched upon. Nor is examined the question of coexistence
of money and assets with higher rates of return. Rather, the coexistence of
different monies with different ”utility returns” is modeled as a consequence
of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distribution.
The scheme of the paper is the following: Section 2 puts forth the model.
Section 3 characterizes monies demand as equilibrium distributions, and char-
acterizes conditions for monies coexistence. Finally, Section 4 ends the paper
with a summary of results.
2 The model
The analysis is cast inside a standard anonymous game. There are two types
of agents: national residents and foreigners. Every national resident is as-
sumed to make a dichotomic choice with regards to money holdings: she
either holds the Pounds or Euros, not both simultaneously (a more general
specification of the action set would only make the analysis less simple with-
out affecting the result). Hence, actions are elements of the countable set
A = {£, E} where obviously £ stands for national currency and E stands
for Euros. Since we are not assuming heterogeneity between either type
of agent, ρ denotes the Dirac measure concentrated on the utility function
u ∈ U . Hence, all residents are endowed with identical preferences and ρ is
an atomic game (anonymous matching requires non-atomicity).
We capture the fact that Pounds are legal tender by assuming that the
payoff that every agent gets from Pound holdings is independent of the dis-
tribution of the action £ among residents. If we denote by ν ∈ M (A) an
element of the set of probability measures on A, then this assumption tan-
tamounts to
u (£, ν) = ϕ (1)
where ϕ ∈ (0, 1] is a constant. The assumption on ϕ is made in order to sim-
plify the analysis. Obviously, utility from legal tender cannot be zero, apart
from widespread examples of bankruptcy which will be examined later, while
taking 1 as the upper bound is a convenient normalization. This hypothesis
rules out the outcome where residents do not hold any legal tender.
On the other hand, the payoff from holding Euros is increasing in the
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fraction of residents making the same choice
u (E, ν) = ν (E)
where ν (E) ∈ [0, 1]. This is a convenient way to assume the existence of a
strategic externality as in Matsuyama et al. [3]. We do not require it, though,
to arise from either the degree of economic integration or the relative size of
economies.
3 Equilibrium distribution demand of monies
We now characterize the demand for monies as the equilibrium distribution
of the anonymous game outlined in the previous Section. To this end, we
borrow from [1] and [4] the following
Definition 1 A CNED for this game is a probability measure τ on U × A
such that
(i) τU = ρ and
(ii) τ (B (τ)) = 1,
where
B(τ) = {(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, τA) ≥ u(x, τA)∀x ∈ A}
and τU and τA are the marginals of τ on U and A respectively.
3.1 Symmetric and asymmetric equilibria
A CNED always exists by [1]. In this game there are two CNEDs. When
Pounds bring the highest utlity, no resident holds Euros
Proposition 2 (no coexistence of monies.) If ϕ > ν (E) then every resident
holds legal tender.
When utility from legal tender is higher than what Euros pay, a symmetric
equilibrium is selected where all homogeneous players go for Pounds. If utility
from holding Euros is strictly less than utility from legal tender, which is
constant, everybody prefers to keep Pounds. Hence, the only way to adopt
the Euro is to join the EMU.
The second equilibrium features coexistence of monies that are equally
distributed among residents.
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Proposition 3 (coexistence of monies.) If ϕ ≤ ν (E) then monies are
equally distributed among residents.
Proof. (this closely follows [4]) Assume the equilibrium distribution of
E is less than ϕ. Then τA (E) < ϕ. Hence, u (£, τA) > u (E, τA) and (ii)
implies τ (B (τ)) = τ (u,£) = 1. But, this in turn implies τA (£) = 1, so all
residents go for Pounds. Conversely, assume the equilibrium distribution of
E is greater than ϕ. Then τA (E) > ϕ. Hence, u (£, τA) < u (E, τA) which
implies τ (B (τ)) = τ (u,E) = 1. But, this in turn implies τA (E) = 1, which
cannot be1. It must be, then, that in equilibrium τA (E) = τA (£) = ϕ.
But since τA is a probability measure on A, τA (E) + τA (£) = 1, whence
ϕ = 1
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. We have proved that in equilibrium the two currencies must be
equally distributed among residents.
In this latter case, currencies cannot coexist in equilibrium. The reason
for this is the following. While every player would go for Euros since they pay
more, this cannot be an equilibrium unless Pounds are absolutely worthless.
From the assumption ϕ ∈ (0, 1] , the distribution of legal tender cannot be
zero, which would be a symmetric equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium must
necessarily be asymmetric, i.e. residents must play different actions even
though they have identical preferences.
It is clear how the assumption ϕ ∈ (0, 1] is crucial in determining the kind
of possible equilibria. How can this be justified? Probably, it is conceivable
that the probability of meeting another Pound holder is never zero inside
the UK, while the probability of meeting another Euro holder can be zero.
This is easily ensured by the presence of either a government or a monetary
authority committed to accepting legal tender. This way, private agents know
the probability of meeting another agent willing to accept Pounds is always
strictly positive. Hence, if utility accrues from trade, utility from Pounds
is bounded below by zero, but never attains its infimum, while utility from
Euros does. In other words, the commitment of the government is sufficient
to select an asymmetric equilibrium.
1If we had allowed for ϕ ∈ [0, 1] , then this outcome would be consistent with equilibrium
in the form of a currency crisis where all residents go for Euros.
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